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I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2007 Big Tobacco settlement resulted in the largest
1
combined attorney’s fee award in United States history. As a result
of the settlement, private attorneys hired by state attorneys general
2
With the
were awarded approximately $15 billion in fees.
magnitude of this award in mind, it is no surprise that fee shifting
has been credited with changing the way parties approach modern
3
litigation. Indeed, Dan Dobbs was correct when he predicted that
changes in the scope and the exceptions to the American Rule
regarding attorney’s fees “are likely to work a substantial impact on
4
the way law is practiced.”

1. E.g., Mark Curriden, Up In Smoke: How Greed, Hubris and High-Stakes
Lobbying Laid Waste to the $246 Billion Tobacco Settlement, ABA JOURNAL E-REPORT,
March 18, 2007, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/up_in_smoke.
2. Id.
3. See David W. Robertson, Court-Awarded Attorney’s Fees in Maritime Cases: The
“American Rule” in Admiralty, 27 J. MAR. L & COM. 507, 512 (1996) (explaining that
the change in scope and exceptions to the American Rule regarding attorney’s
fees are likely to substantially impact the way law is practiced); see also Dan B.
Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem, 1986 DUKE
L. J. 435, 437 (1986) (“The practice of awarding attorney fees against adversaries is
causing important changes in the way litigation is financed in the United States.”).
4. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 276–77 (2d ed. 1993).
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In 1870, Congress created the first fee-shifting statute that
6
awarded attorney fees to the prevailing plaintiff at trial. The law
was passed following the Civil War “to ensure the enforcement of
7
the newly enacted civil rights acts.” Since that time, awarding
attorney’s fees to a prevailing litigant has become an increasingly
8
common practice at both the state and federal level.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, federal statutes that allowed for
9
Specifically, the
attorney’s fee awards increased dramatically.
number of federal fee-shifting provisions increased from
10
approximately 30 in 1975 to approximately 150 in 1983. At the
same time, scholarly work devoted to the issue of attorney’s fees
increased as authors turned their attention to the fee-shifting
11
phenomenon.
Some took a critical approach to the topic,
arguing that fee shifting compromised what Justice Stewart had
dubbed the court system’s “prime goal” of securing the “just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
12
proceeding.” In particular, Michael D. Green’s extensive analysis
5. The term “fee shifting” is used throughout this note and generally refers
to the rules that decide which party will pay for the attorney’s fees accrued by both
parties during the litigation. See Ronald Breautigam et al., An Economic Analysis of
Alternative Fee Shifting Systems, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 173 (1984).
6. Kyle R. Kravitz, Note, Denying the Devil His Due: Contingency Fee Multipliers
After City of Burlington v. Dague, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1661, 1661 (1993) (analyzing the
Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington v. Dague and arguing for several
permissible alternatives to contingency enhancement).
7. Id.
8. 1 ROBERT L. ROSSI, ATTORNEYS’ FEES § 6:7 (3d ed. 2009).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See generally Joan Chipser, Attorney’s Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception,
29 HASTINGS L.J. 319 (1977) (providing a historical overview of the federal bad
faith exception and arguing for its adoption in California); Dobbs, supra note 3
(discussing the bases for attorney’s fees, who is entitled to them, and how they are
calculated); John Luebsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee
Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984) (providing a detailed account of the
American Rule from the emergence of colonial legislation to the partial
abandonment of the rule due to emerging exceptions in the second half of the
twentieth century); John J. Sullivan, The Equal Access to Justice Act in the Federal
Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1089 (1984) (arguing for an expansive construction of
the “substantially justified” test within the Equal Access to Justice Act to permit fee
awards when the government’s actions and arguments were not part of a dispute
in which there was some likelihood it could have prevailed); Joyce M. Zehr,
Attorney’s Fees, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 793 (1987) (providing a practical overview of
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ posture towards the application of attorney’s
fees in addition to examining the policy implications for and against allowing
waivers as a condition for settlement).
12. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 202 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
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of the effect of fee shifting on efficiency and fairness pointed to two
critical problems related to attorney’s fees: (1) an increase in
13
piecemeal appeals and (2) confusion regarding the appropriate
14
time to appeal.
Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed similar
concerns regarding attorney’s fees in T.A Schifsky and Sons, Inc. v.
15
Bahr Construction, LLC.
While the court’s decision does not
illuminate the degree to which fee shifting has burdened courts
and litigants, it does indicate that problems relating to fee shifting
in Minnesota persist. In light of T.A. Schifsky, this note attempts to
analyze issues of attorney’s fees in Minnesota with a focus on
procedural efficiency and fairness to litigants. Given that similar
analyses have often been confined to a federal perspective, an
16
analysis at the state level is particularly important.

(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 1); see also Richard S. Crummins, Judgment on the Merits
Leaving Attorney’s Fees Issues Undecided: A Final Judgment?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 487,
488 (1987) (“[F]ee issues are often determined many months after liability issues
have been resolved. This delay, when considered in light of the requirement that
a judgment be ‘final’ before it may be appealed, poses serious problems for
litigants who, understandably, wish to expedite the resolution of their disputes by
appealing as early as possible.”); Michael D. Green, From Here to Attorney’s Fees:
Certainty, Efficiency, and Fairness in the Journey to the Appellate Courts, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 207, 211 (1984) (“With the increasing frequency and significance of fee
shifting has come substantial confusion over when, during a given case, the issue
of attorney’s fees must be decided, the appropriate procedural devices for raising
and deciding a fee request, and the extent to which resolution of the fee issue is a
predicate for appellate jurisdiction.”). Minnesota has adopted this same language
to guide state proceedings. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[The rules] shall be construed
and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action.”).
13. See Green, supra note 12, at 276 (“Severing defendants’ fees from the
merits produces many of the disadvantages previously discussed in the context of
plaintiffs seeking fees. These include enlarging the number of piecemeal appeals .
. . .”).
14. Id. at 211 (“Where an individual has asserted a claim for attorney’s fees,
this confusion has resulted in the loss of the right to appellate review of the merits
of the case or appellate review of an award of attorney’s fees.”).
15. 773 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Minn. 2009).
16. An analysis of the issues involving attorney’s fees appeals in California has
been published. Jineen T. Cuddy, Fee Simple? Indeterminable: Inconsistent Procedures
Regarding Attorney Fees and Posting Appeal Bonds, 24 PAC. L.J. 141 (1992) (urging the
California courts or state legislature to resolve the judicial confusion regarding
whether a judgment for attorney’s fees is automatically stayed pending appeal); see
also ROSSI, supra note 8 at § 11:1 (“A few jurisdictions have adopted the ‘private
attorney general’ exception to the American Rule, under which fees may be
allowed where litigation vindicates a public policy, but attempts to have such a
broad rule recognized have generally been unsuccessful.”).
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This note begins by outlining the origins of fee reallocation in
17
Part III provides a chronological
America and in Minnesota.
outline of important Minnesota Supreme Court decisions that
18
address the treatment and characterization of attorney’s fees. Part
IV is devoted to a discussion of the recent Minnesota Supreme
19
Court decision in T.A. Schifsky.
Part V of the note addresses
Green’s criticisms related to the effects of fee shifting within the
context of Minnesota case law. Specifically it discusses (1) whether
Minnesota’s treatment of attorney’s fees burdens courts with
inefficient, piecemeal appeals, and (2) whether Minnesota’s
characterization of attorney’s fees nurtures unfairness within the
20
appeals process.
With respect to the first issue, the note concludes that while
Minnesota case law allows for attorney’s fees to be appealed
separately from the merits, this allowance does not burden the
21
court system with piecemeal appeals.
This is because district
courts generally rule on attorney’s fees in an expedient manner,
which in turn allows appellate courts to consolidate attorney’s fees
appeals with appeals on the merits and prevent piecemeal
litigation. With respect to the second issue—fairness to litigants—
the note concludes that the holding in T.A. Schifksy fails to provide
the necessary guidance for litigants to confidently anticipate the
22
running of the appeals period. In order to prevent confusion and
untimely appeals, two solutions are proposed that may provide
some clarity to the inherently complex relationship between
attorney’s fees and merit-based judgments.
II. HISTORY OF ATTORNEY’S FEES
A. The English Rule Regarding Attorney’s Fees
The prevailing maxim under the English Rule regarding
attorney’s fees can be summarized in three simple words: the loser
23
pays.
Under the English Rule, “a losing litigant must pay the

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 55 (2005).
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24

winner’s costs and attorney’s fees.” Enacted in 1275, the Statute
25
of Gloucester was the probable origin of the English Rule.
Despite its limitations on the disbursement of costs, the statute was
the first to give plaintiffs a right to fees in “specified real property
26
actions.” While early English courts allowed the Chancellor to
award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party, the Chancellor rarely
27
exercised this power.
Over time, and primarily by statute, the rules pertaining to
28
attorney’s fees expanded in English courts. While traditional feeshifting rules often favored the plaintiff, defendants were given
power to recover attorney’s fees on the same basis around the turn
29
of the fifteenth century. Enacted in 1875, Order 55 of the Rules
of Court provided that costs and attorney’s fees attached to court
proceedings would be under the sole discretion of the English
30
courts. Despite its elaborate system of taxing costs, the modern
English system is still heavily influenced by the principle of “the
31
loser pays.”
B. The Development of the American Rule
The American Rule provides that all litigants must bear their
32
own attorney’s fees absent statutory or contractual authorization.
It may be difficult to provide a historical synopsis of the American
24. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 609 (9th ed. 2009).
25. Geoffrey Woodroffe, Loser Pays and Conditional Fees – An English Solution?,
37 WASHBURN L.J. 345, 345 (1998) (discussing the historical development of both
the English Rule and the American Rule and comparing the merits of each
approach to the issue of attorney’s fees).
26. Id.; see also Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 852 (1929)
(explaining that the Statute of Gloucester was “[t]he first statute which gave the
plaintiff his costs, and the one on which the whole law on the subject was based
until 1875”).
27. John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured
Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570 (1993).
28. Id. at 1571.
29. Goodhart, supra note 26, at 853.
30. Id. at 854.
31. The continued adherence to the English Rule has created some
additional gridlock and delay in English courts. See Vargo, supra note 27, at 1571
(“Under this system, the solicitor representing the winning party prepares a bill of
costs, detailing each item of taxable expense. If the losing party agrees, it pays the
bill; parties, however, rarely agree. When disputed, the parties present their
itemized expenses to a taxing master who decides the appropriate amounts after a
hearing.”).
32. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 98 (9th ed. 2009); 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 55
(2005).
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Rule in light of John Leubsdorf’s assertion that “the American Rule
33
has no history.” However, this difficulty is likely because, “as far
back as one can trace, courts in [America] have allowed winning
litigants to recover their litigation costs from losers only to the
34
extent prescribed by the legislature.”
Prior to American
independence, colonial legislatures commonly passed laws that
limited the amount that attorneys could charge for their services
and the amount that “could be recovered from a defeated
35
adversary.” However, lawyers in the colonies refused to revert to
the complexities of the English Court system and began emerging
as “private profit-seekers” during the time of the American
36
Revolution. Lack of legislative interference with private attorneyclient fee agreements was an important factor in the establishment
37
of the American Rule.
The American Rule has confronted numerous challenges
38
throughout its history.
However, 179 years after the Supreme
Court adhered to the Rule in Arcambel v. Wiseman, the Court
reiterated its loyalty to the Rule in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
39
Wilderness Society.
Referring to the American Rule, the Alyeska
Court stated: “It is deeply rooted in our history and in
congressional policy; and it is not for us to invade the legislature’s
province by redistributing litigation costs in the manner suggested
40
by respondents and followed by the Court of Appeals.”

33. Luebsdorf, supra note 11, at 9.
34. Id.; see Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796). Responding to the
circuit court’s decision to charge the losing party $1,600 in attorney’s fees, the
Court stated,
[w]e do not think this charge ought to be allowed. The general practice
in the United States is in opposition to it; and even if that practice were
not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court,
till it is changed, or modified, by statute.
Id.
35. Luebsdorf, supra note 11, at 10.
36. Id. at 13.
37. Vargo, supra note 27, at 1575.
38. John M. Bjorkman, Minnesota and the American Rule: The Recoverability of
Attorneys’ Fees Following In Re Silicone Implant Insurance Coverage Litigation, 30
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 541, 542 (2003) (providing a thorough, detailed history of
the American Rule and its application in Minnesota courts).
39. See Arcambel, 3 U.S. at 306; Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y,
421 U.S. 240, 271 (1975).
40. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 271.
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Despite the American Rule’s continued relevance in the
American legal landscape, a number of exceptions have diminished
its prominence over time. For example, an award of attorney’s fees
41
may be based on a court’s inherent power to sanction.
This
practice is often dubbed the “bad faith exception” to the American
42
Rule. In addition, attorney’s fees may also be recovered when a
contract under which the plaintiff brings suit includes a fee-shifting
43
provision. Luebsdorf notes that the contractual exception was the
most important exception during the late nineteenth century “if
44
importance is measured by frequency of use.”
As courts were
acknowledging the shifting of fees based on private contracts, both
federal and state legislatures began eroding the American Rule
45
through statutory provisions.
Over the past century, the
proliferation of such statutes at both the federal and state level has
chipped away at the American Rule’s dominance in the United
46
States’ judicial landscape.
C. A Brief History of Fee Shifting in Minnesota
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the American Rule
47
as early as 1874. In Kelly v. Rogers, the court held that the plaintiff
could not recover attorney’s fees incurred as a result of the
48
defendant’s fraudulent actions. Just three years later, the court
reaffirmed the importance of the Rule in Frost v. Jordan, holding
that the defendant could not recover the attorney’s fees he
49
incurred as a result of defending an attachment bond action.
Interestingly, in both early cases, the court justified the denial of
attorney’s fees in part by alluding to the unfairness of providing
41. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 56 (2005). This list of exceptions to the American
Rule cited in this section is demonstrative, not exhaustive. Other exceptions
include common fund attorney’s fees and the third-party exception. See Vargo,
supra note 27, at 1579–81; see also Bergquist v. Kreidler, 158 Minn. 127, 130, 196
N.W. 964, 965 (1924) (applying the third-party exception to the American Rule).
42. See Chipser, supra note 11, at 319.
43. Luebsdorf, supra note 11, at 24.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 25.
46. Id. at 29–30 (“While the courts were expanding these exceptions to the
American Rule, legislatures were also coming around to the view that at least some
litigation was a desirable thing. Fee provisions were attached to a variety of federal
statutes, and also to state statutes.”).
47. Bjorkman, supra note 38, at 543.
48. Kelly v. Rogers, 21 Minn. 146, 152–53 (1874).
49. Frost v. Jordan, 37 Minn. 544, 547, 36 N.W. 713, 714 (1887).
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attorney’s fees for one party over the other.
Although the
Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the importance of the
American Rule, the court limited the Rule from the bench. For
51
example, in 1924, the court recognized the third-party exception.
In Bergquist v. Kreidler, the court determined that parties thrust into
the litigation by a third party’s fraudulent misrepresentation are
entitled to recover attorney’s fees as a part of the damages in the
52
case.
In the early nineteenth century, many states began to pass laws
53
concerning the allocation of costs and attorney’s fees. The first
set of these statutes was passed during the Granger Era and
concerned the reallocation of attorney’s fees in the event that a
railroad was found liable for harming livestock or charging
54
unlawful rates.
Influenced by this legislation, in 1874 the
Minnesota Legislature adopted its first statute that provided for the
55
reallocation of attorney’s fees.
Section fifteen of the statute
provided:
[T]he person, or corporation, or town, village or city so
offended against, may, for each offense, recover of such
railroad corporation . . . three times the amount of
damages sustained by the party aggrieved, together with
the costs and reasonable attorney’s fee, to be fixed by the
court when the same is heard on appeal or otherwise, and
56
taxed as part of the costs of the case.

50. Articulating its rationale for denying the plaintiff’s request for fees, the
Kelly court stated: “[T]o allow these expenses to the plaintiff, which are never
allowed to a successful defendant, would give the former an unfair advantage in
the contest.” Kelly, 21 Minn. at 152. The Frost court stated: “[T]o allow attorney’s
fees would give the defendant in the attachment suit an unfair advantage over the
plaintiff.” Frost, 37 Minn. at 546, 36 N.W. at 714.
51. Bergquist v. Kreidler, 158 Minn. 127, 130, 196 N.W. 964, 965 (1924).
52. Id. Specifically, the court stated:
[T]he burden of a mischoice, made in good faith and upon reasonable
grounds for the action taken, should be placed on the wrongdoer rather
than his victim. That result will be accomplished only by holding that the
latter may recover the reasonable expenses of litigation, undertaken in
good faith and upon reasonable grounds, to avoid the results of the
defendants’ wrong.
Id.
53. Vargo, supra note 27, at 1577.
54. Luebsdorf, supra note 11, at 25.
55. 1874 Minn. Laws 148.
56. Id. The quoted language is taken from Chapter XXVI, Section 15.
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In 1930, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the
continuing trend of statutory fee shifting as an important exception
57
to the American Rule. While the court noted that the winning
party generally does not have the privilege of attorney’s fee
reimbursement, it did recognize that “[t]here are statutory
provisions for allowing attorney’s fees to the successful party in
58
certain kinds of actions.”
In many states, provisions for the
reallocation of attorney’s fees became more prevalent during the
59
second half of the twentieth century. Minnesota seems to have
60
followed this trend. Minnesota statutes included 444 fee-shifting
61
provisions at the end of the 2008 legislative session. Attorney’s fee
provisions are now common in a variety of Minnesota statutes, such
62
63
as those concerning liens, corporate business practice, and
64
environmental regulations.
57. Smith v. Chaffee, 181 Minn. 322, 324–25, 232 N.W. 515, 516 (1930).
58. Id. at 324, 232 N.W. at 516.
59. ROSSI, supra note 8, § 6:7.
60. While an index search is not conclusive as to statutory trends, a
comparison of the statutory indexes from 1941 and 2008 indicates a vast disparity
in the amount of provisions in Minnesota statutes that allow for the reallocation of
attorney’s fees. Compare 2 REVISOR OF STATUTES, MINNESOTA STATUTES 4426–27
(1941) (the index of Minnesota statutes lists nineteen provisions for the
reallocation of attorney’s fees under the topic heading “Attorneys At Law” and
subheading “Fees and Compensation”), with 13 REVISOR OF STATUTES, MINNESOTA
STATUTES 953–56 (2008) (the index of Minnesota statutes lists 339 provisions for
the reallocation of attorney’s fees under the topic heading “Attorney’s Fees”).
Moreover, because the 2008 index references multiple other sections in which
relevant provisions can be found, the number of Minnesota statutory provisions
for the reallocation of attorney’s fees in 2008 exceeds the number listed under the
heading “Attorney’s Fees.” 13 REVISOR OF STATUTES, MINNESOTA STATUTES 953-56
(2008); see also infra note 61.
61. See Information Brief from Matt Gehring, Legislative Analyst, Research
Department, to Minnesota House of Representatives (Nov. 2008), available at
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/attyfee.pdf.
62. See MINN. STAT. § 270C.63, subdiv. 15 (2008) (providing for an award of
attorney’s fees if a lien is found to be erroneous); MINN. STAT. § 514.945, subdiv. 8
(2008) (providing for an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in an
agricultural producer’s lien); MINN. STAT. § 514.99, subdiv. 5 (2008) (providing for
an award of attorney’s fees in certain common law lien cases).
63. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.461, subdiv. 4(a) (2008) (providing for an award
of attorney’s fees in the event that a corporation unsuccessfully applies for an
order banning the disclosure of commercially sensitive information); MINN. STAT.
§ 302A.467 (2008) (providing discretion for a court to award attorney’s fees when
a corporate officer violates a statute within Chapter 302A).
64. See MINN. STAT. § 115.072 (2008) (providing for an award of “litigation
expenses incurred by the state” when the state prevails in securing a civil penalty,
injunctive relief, or an action to compel compliance under Minnesota’s Water
Pollution Control Act); MINN. STAT. § 115A.86, subdiv. 6(c) (2008) (providing for
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III. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES AND THE
FINAL JUDGMENT RULE
A. A Common Conundrum: The Effect of Attorney’s Fees Appeals on the
Finality of Judgments
A final judgment is “a court’s last action that settles the rights
of the parties and disposes of all issues in controversy, except for
the award of costs (and, sometimes attorney’s fees) and
65
enforcement of the judgment.” According to the final judgment
rule, a party can only appeal from a final decision or judgment in
66
the absence of a statute or rule that dictates otherwise. Where a
trial court’s decision is not final, the appellate court does not have
67
jurisdiction over the appeal and must dismiss it. While the final
judgment rule was first embodied in a federal statute, most states
68
have adopted it in a similar form. As with many legal principles,
however, the final judgment rule is more easily stated than
69
applied. One can no longer assume that the last order in the case
70
is the only final appealable order.
Two competing policies underlying the final judgment rule
have nurtured the continued confusion over the rule’s application:
preventing costly, inefficient piecemeal appeals and minimizing
71
delay when appealing a judgment.
Proponents of the final
judgment rule argue that the rule furthers an efficient court system
an award of attorney’s fees for a county in the event that a party delivers mixed
waste to an improper facility).
65. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 919 (9th ed. 2009). Worded differently, a
judgment is not final if an additional claim has yet to be resolved. 3 ERIC J.
MAGNUSON & DAVID F. HERR, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: APPELLATE RULES
ANNOTATED § 103.6(b) (2010).
66. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 79 (2007).
67. Id. The final judgment rule is a jurisdictional requirement. Id. While
almost all jurisdictions adhere to it, its application depends on its adoption in the
form of a statute or rule. Id.
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United
States . . . .”).
69. Annotation, Appealability, Under U.S.C.A. § 1291, of Order Awarding or
Denying Attorneys’ Fees, 73 A.L.R. FED. 271 (1985) (discussing how the problem of
determining whether an order is tied to the merits of the case is particularly
troublesome for an order awarding attorney’s fees).
70. See id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 919 (9th ed. 2009) (illuminating
the inconsistent effect that attorney’s fee determinations have on final judgments
by stating that final judgments dispose of all issues “except for the award of costs
(and, sometimes, attorney’s fees).”).
71. Crummins, supra note 12, at 491.
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72

by reducing the number of appeals. In addition, the rule has the
effect of consolidating all claims of error into one appellate
73
proceeding.
Consolidation not only reduces court costs and
attorney’s fees for litigants, but also ensures that judges are hearing
appeals in an efficient manner that prevents the clogging of
74
dockets.
On the other hand, a strict application of the final
judgment rule can cause significant delay in appellate review that
75
In some circumstances,
may further burden the court system.
such a delay can also cause harm to the party denied immediate
76
review.
A pending determination of attorney’s fees subsequent to a
judgment on the merits provides a practical glimpse into the
77
tension between these two competing policies.
In some
jurisdictions, a pending attorney’s fee determination may prevent
the original judgment from becoming final and appealable, thus
preventing the possibility of the attorney’s fee issue being appealed
78
separate from the merits. In these jurisdictions, the attorney’s
79
fees are often considered to be attached to the merits. In other
jurisdictions, the attorney’s fee determination does not prevent an
initial judgment from becoming final, meaning the initial
80
judgment can be appealed without delay.
These jurisdictions
often characterize the attorney’s fees as collateral to the merits of
81
the case. In either case, the relationship between the attorney’s
fee issue and the initial judgment has significant consequences for
litigants’ ability to properly appeal in Minnesota because of its
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See id.; Green, supra note 12, at 215–16.
76. Green, supra note 12, at 215–16 (“More serious hardships resulting from
the final decision requirement may include losing a unique piece of property
without any opportunity to recover it after a successful appeal, or suffering
‘irreparable injury’ when injunctive relief is incorrectly denied.”).
77. Crummins, supra note 12, at 488; see also Annotation, supra note 69, at
271.
78. See Local Union No. 1992 of Elec. Workers v. Okonite Co., 358 F.3d 278,
287 n.13 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting the exception when attorney’s fee issues are not
collateral to the merits of the litigation because they are an integral part of the
contractual relief sought).
79. Id.
80. United States ex rel. Shutt v. Cmty. Home & Health Care Servs., Inc., 550
F.3d 764, 766 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Int’l Ass’n of Ironworkers Local Union 75 v.
Madison Indus., Inc., 733 F.2d 656, 659 (9th Cir. 1984)) (adopting the bright-line
rule that “all attorney’s fees requests are collateral to the main action”).
81. Id.
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82

effect on the proper time to appeal.
In the past, Minnesota courts generally held that a judgment
83
had to be “complete” in order for an appeal to be proper. Despite
these efforts, issues continue to arise regarding the relationship
between attorney’s fees, final judgments, and proper appellate
procedure in Minnesota. The following section provides an
overview on how Minnesota courts have addressed the complex
relationship between a final judgment and a subsequent
determination of attorney’s fees.
B. Attorney’s Fees Litigation in Minnesota—The “Collateral” vs.
“Attached to the Merits” Characterization
1.

Spaeth v. City of Plymouth

In 1984, the Minnesota Supreme Court first addressed the
relationship between a subsequent determination of attorney’s fees
84
and a final, appealable judgment in Spaeth v. City of Plymouth. In
Spaeth, the plaintiff sought attorney’s fees and petitioned the court
to compel the city of Plymouth to initiate eminent domain
85
proceedings on his flooded property. The trial court granted the
82. On December 7, 1967, the Minnesota Legislature adopted Minnesota
Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure 104.01 and 103.03, which codified prior
statutes setting forth the necessary criteria for a proper appeal. MINN. R. CIV. APP.
P. 103.03; MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01. The former civil appellate procedural rules
regarding time for filing and service of a civil appeal were codified by statute and
were subsequently repealed after the adoption of additional appellate procedural
rules in 1967. MINN. STAT. § 605.08 (repealed 1974). Rule 104.01 was later
simplified by an amendment in 1998 that established a shorter, sixty-day period to
appeal from both final judgments and appealable orders. MINN. R. CIV. APP. P.
104.01. In addition, Rule 103.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate
Procedure was amended in 1998 to make clear that only final judgments or partial
judgments under Rule 54.02 are appealable. MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 103.03(a); see
MAGNUSON & HERR, supra note 65. Therefore, according to the current Minnesota
rules, an individual filing a notice of appeal must do so within sixty days of the
judgment or order, but must also ensure that the judgment is final in nature.
MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 103.03(a); MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01. Once a judgment is
deemed final, the limited time for appeal begins to run. See MINN. R. CIV. APP. P.
104.01.
83. See In re Estate of Colby, 223 Minn. 157, 157, 25 N.W.2d 769, 769 (1947)
(holding that where costs had not been taxed and had not been waived, the
judgment is considered incomplete and any appeal should be dismissed as
premature); see also MAGNUSON & HERR, supra note 65, at § 103.6 (noting that in
older Minnesota cases, the judgment had to be “complete” in order for an appeal
to be available).
84. 344 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Minn. 1984).
85. Id. at 817.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 2

280

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1

plaintiff’s writ of mandamus and ordered the city to commence
86
eminent domain proceedings. In addition, the court held that
the plaintiff was entitled to attorney’s fees and expert fees pursuant
87
to Minnesota Statutes section 117.045.
Before the trial court
88
decided on the amount of fees, the city appealed. The trial court
89
then awarded the plaintiff fees in the amount of $66,158.12. The
city appealed again, challenging both the trial court’s continuing
jurisdiction to decide the amount of attorney’s fees and the
90
amount of attorney’s fees the court awarded. The supreme court
91
subsequently consolidated both appeals into a single proceeding.
On appeal, the city argued that the filing of its first notice of
appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to decide on issues
92
relating to the attorney’s fees.
At the time of the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s review of Spaeth, Minnesota Rule of Civil
Appellate Procedure 108.03 provided that perfection of an appeal
“shall stay all further proceedings in the trial court upon the
judgment or order appealed from or the matter embraced therein;
but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter included in
the action, and not affected by the judgment or order appealed
93
from.” Therefore, the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court to
determine issues relating to attorney’s fees depended on whether
the attorney’s fees were considered collateral to the merits or
94
attached to the merits of the underlying litigation.
Ultimately, the court concluded that attorney’s fees pursuant
to section 117.045 were inherently “a matter independent of the
95
merits of the litigation.” In its reasoning, the court noted that a
decision to provide trial courts with continuing jurisdiction over
attorney’s fee determinations would not undercut the policy

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 824.
93. MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 108.03.
94. Spaeth, 344 N.W.2d at 824. The consolidation of the two appeals was likely
an attempt by the court to show that the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction over
attorney’s fees would not undercut the policy against piecemeal appeals. Through
consolidation, the court was able to hear all issues regarding the attorney’s fees
and eminent domain actions in one proceeding. See id. at 817.
95. Id. at 825.
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96

against piecemeal appeals.
Summarizing a case in which the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided to provide the district
court with continuing jurisdiction over an attorney’s fee
determination, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
It also concluded that to do so would not undercut the
policy against piecemeal appeals. Rather, it believed such
a rule would be less likely to cause delay and waste effort
because the attorneys’ fees motion may be decided before
the pending appeal has been argued and thus an appeal
from the ruling on attorneys’ fees could be consolidated
97
with the pending appeal.
Moreover, because the plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees was
collateral to the merits of the case, the fee award after the
judgment on the merits was proper and did not affect the finality of
98
the original judgment.
2.

Welsh v. City of Orono

Just six months after its decision in Spaeth, the Minnesota
Supreme Court broadened the “collateral” nature of attorney’s fees
99
in Welsh v. City of Orono. Welsh involved an action for declaratory
and injunctive relief brought by a landowner after the city denied
his application for a conditional use permit to conduct lakebed
100
dredging.
Welsh moved for summary judgment on the grounds
101
that the city did not have jurisdiction to regulate his activities.
The trial court granted summary judgment and ordered the city to
102
Welsh
cease its interference with Welsh’s dredging activities.
103
then moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
104
When the trial court denied the motion, Welsh appealed.
As a means of removing the attorney’s fees issue from the
appeal, the city of Orono echoed the defendant’s argument in
105
Spaeth and asserted that the trial court was “without jurisdiction to

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
1984).

Id.
Id. (citing Terket v. Lund, 623 F.2d 29, 34 (7th Cir. 1980)).
Id. at 825–26.
355 N.W.2d 117, 124 (Minn. 1984).
Id. at 119.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 123; see Spaeth v. City of Plymouth, 344 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Minn.
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make any order or render any decision affecting the order
106
Citing Spaeth, the court explained that it had
appealed from.”
adopted the collateral proceeding approach in interpreting an
inverse condemnation attorney’s fee provision and that it saw “no
reason why [it] should not apply the same approach in resolving
timeliness of post-judgment motions for attorney fees under 42
107
U.S.C. § 1988.”
Therefore, the court determined that the
attorney’s fee issue in Welsh would be characterized as independent
108
of the merits of the litigation.
3.

American Family Insurance Company v. Peterson

Two years after embracing the “collateral” nature of attorney’s
fees in Spaeth and Welsh, the Minnesota Supreme Court came to the
opposite conclusion in American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v.
109
Peterson. In Peterson, the trial court entered the original judgment
110
and reserved the issue of attorney’s fees for later consideration.
Ultimately, the defendant-insured was awarded attorney’s fees
based on his claim that American Family Insurance refused to
111
defend him in bad faith.
Reversing the court of appeals, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that absent an express
determination that the original judgment was final and appealable,
“the 90-day appeal period [did] not begin to run until the entry of
the amended judgment adjudicating all issues, including the issue
112
of attorney fees.” As such, the court impliedly concluded that the
issues involving attorney’s fees in Peterson were not collateral to the

106. Welsh, 355 N.W.2d at 123. This language summarizes the prior Minnesota
Supreme Court decision in State v. Bentley, 216 Minn. 146, 161, 12 N.W.2d 347,
356 (1943).
107. Welsh, 355 N.W.2d at 124. However, the court refused to reverse the trial
court’s denial of Welsh’s motion for attorney’s fees. Id. The court concluded that
“a private action questioning a municipality’s regulatory jurisdiction under state
law” was not within the “spirit” of section 1988 governing fee awards. Id.
108. Id.
109. 380 N.W.2d 495, 495 (Minn. 1986).
110. Id. at 497.
111. T.A. Schifsky, 773 N.W.2d 783, 789 (Minn. 2009) (citing Am. Family Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 393 N.W.2d 212, 217 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), rev’d, 380 N.W.2d
495, 495 (Minn. 1986)).
112. Peterson, 380 N.W.2d at 497. However, the court did note that the time for
appeal would begin to run if the court had properly certified a partial final
judgment under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 54.02. Id. at 496–
97. While an award of attorney’s fees may have implications for a certification
under Rule 54.02, that discussion is beyond the scope of this case note.
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merits of the case; rather, they were attached to the merits.
Interestingly, the Peterson court noted that the characterization
of attorney’s fees as attached to the merits “advances [the] general
policy against piecemeal litigation” that is reflected in the
114
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure and the analysis in Spaeth.
While the Spaeth court agreed that piecemeal appeals should be
avoided, it ultimately concluded that the collateral characterization
115
of attorney’s fees was the best way to achieve this goal.
In
referring to Spaeth’s emphasis on the prevention of piecemeal
appeals, however, the Peterson court failed to explain how it could
support the same policy through the adoption of an opposite
holding.
4.

Post-Peterson Litigation

Since Peterson, the Minnesota Supreme Court has realigned
itself with the Spaeth ruling that attorney’s fee issues are collateral
to the merits of the case. In Kellar v. Von Holtum, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that motions for attorney’s fee sanctions,
costs, and disbursements are independent of the merits of litigation
116
such that fees can be awarded after an appeal has been decided.
In support of its holding, the court added that “there is likely to be
little, if any, harm caused by waiting to resolve such collateral issues
117
until the merits are resolved.”
However, a 2008 Minnesota Court of Appeals decision is
evidence that the Peterson decision has blurred any bright-line rule
regarding the relationship between attorney’s fees issues and an

113. See T.A. Schifsky, 773 N.W.2d at 789–90.
114. Peterson, 380 N.W.2d at 497. With the understanding that its holding may
weaken judicial efficiency by producing piecemeal litigation, the Spaeth court
urged appellate courts to take specific actions. Spaeth v. City of Plymouth, 344
N.W.2d 815, 825 (Minn. 1984). Referring to subsequent determinations of
attorney’s fees, the Spaeth court “strenuously urge[d] the district courts either to
rule on such claims as soon as possible after entry of judgment on the merits, or to
not enter judgment on the merits until the fees issue has been finally resolved.”
Id.
115. Spaeth, 344 N.W.2d at 825.
116. Kellar v. Von Holtum, 605 N.W.2d 696, 700 (Minn. 2000).
117. Id. However, the court seems to ignore the fact that the production of
piecemeal appeals through the separation of the attorney’s fee issues from the
merits can be harmful by burdening court dockets. See Green, supra note 12, at
276 (noting that the creation of piecemeal appeals is one of the many
“disadvantages” of severing attorney’s fees from the merits).
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118

underlying judgment on the merits.
In City of Waite Park, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed the defendant’s argument
that the failure to raise the issue of damages in an initial appeal
119
precludes a later assertion of damages.
In doing so, the court
summarized Peterson by explaining that when district courts reserve
the monetary award of attorney’s fees for later determination, the
appeal period does not begin to run until entry of an amended
120
judgment adjudicating all issues.
IV. THE T.A. SCHIFSKY DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
In T.A. Schifsky & Sons, Inc. v. Bahr Construction, LLC,
Consolidated Lumber Company held four mechanic’s liens against
121
Bahr Construction.
When Consolidated Lumber sought to
foreclose on the mechanic’s liens, Premier Bank challenged the
validity of the liens by asserting that they failed to describe and
identify the liened property with reasonable certainty as required
122
by Minnesota law.
On November 26, 2007, the district court
found that the liens were valid despite their erroneous listing and
produced an order stipulating that Consolidated Lumber was
entitled to the value of the liens in addition to reasonable
123
attorney’s fees submitted to the court for later approval.
The
district court concluded the order with the following words:
“[t]here being no just cause for delay, let judgment be entered
124
125
accordingly.” Judgment was entered on December 13, 2007.
Premier Bank’s motion to amend the district court’s findings
of fact and motion for a new trial were denied on February 1, 2008,
and Consolidated Lumber served Premier Bank with a notice of

118. City of Waite Park v. Minn. Office of Admin. Hearings, 758 N.W.2d 347
(Minn. 2008).
119. Id. at 354–55.
120. Id. at 354.
121. 773 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Minn. 2009).
122. Id. Premier Bank asserted this claim based on subdivision 2(5) of section
514.08 of the Minnesota Statutes. Id. The mechanic’s lien in question identified
the liened property as being located in Section thirty-three, Township thirty,
Range twenty-two, while the actual location of the property was Section thirty-four,
Township thirty, Range twenty-two. Id.
123. Id. at 786.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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filing of the order denying the motions on February 6, 2008. On
May 22, 2008, the district court awarded Consolidated Lumber
$11,543.74 in attorney’s fees, and judgment of the fee order was
127
entered on July 24, 2008.
On July 30, 2008, just six days after the fee order was entered,
Premier Bank filed a notice of appeal, citing both the December
128
13, 2008 lien judgment and the May 22, 2008 attorney’s fee order.
In its notice, Premier Bank described the May 22, 2008, attorney’s
fee order as “a final adjudication of all the remaining issues set
129
forth in the partial judgment . . . entered on December 13, 2007.”
On August 27, 2008, the court of appeals dismissed Premier Bank’s
appeal as untimely by concluding that the December 13, 2007 lien
judgment was immediately appealable because it contained express
determinations under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure
130
104.01 and Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Rule 54.02
states, in relevant part:
When multiple claims for relief or multiple parties are
involved in an action, the court may direct entry of a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties only upon an express determination that there
is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the
131
entry of judgment.
Rule 104.01 states, in relevant part:
An appeal may be taken from a judgment entered
pursuant to Rule 54.02, Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure, within 60 days of the entry of the judgment
only if the trial court makes an express determination that there is
no just reason for delay and expressly directs the entry of a final
judgment. The time to appeal from any other judgment
entered pursuant to Rule 54.02 shall not begin to run
126. Id.
127. Id. It is important to note that the attorney’s fees judgment was entered
over seven months after the district court’s original judgment on December 13,
2007, regarding the liens. See id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (alteration in original).
130. Id. In dismissing Premier Bank’s notice of appeal, the court of appeals
states that the December 13, 2007, district court order “contains the express
determinations under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01 and Minn. R. Civ. P 54.02 to
allow an immediate appeal.” Id. The T.A. Schifsky opinion implies that the express
determinations referenced by the court of appeals refer to the concluding
language in the December 13, 2007, district court order: “[t]here being no just
cause for delay, let judgment be entered accordingly.” Id.
131. MINN. R. CIV. P. 54.02 (emphasis added).
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until entry of a judgment which adjudicates all the claims
132
and rights and liabilities of the remaining parties.
According to the court, because the district court made
express determinations that the December 13, 2007 order was
immediately appealable, Premier Bank was required to file a notice
of appeal within sixty days of Consolidated Lumber’s notice of
filing the February order denying Premier Bank’s post-trial motions
133
in order to have maintained a timely appeal.
B. The Court’s Holding
Appealing the dismissal, Premier Bank attempted to persuade
the Minnesota Supreme Court that its July 30, 2008 appeal was not
untimely because the November 26, 2007 order regarding the liens
was not properly certified as a final partial judgment under
134
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02.
The court noted that
the language “there being no just cause for delay, let judgment be
entered accordingly” does not necessarily make a judgment a final
135
partial judgment under Rule 54.02.
Fundamentally, application
of the rule necessitates “multiple claims for relief or multiple
136
parties.”
Interpreting the language of the rule and the legal
meaning of a claim, the court held that the November 26 district
court order was not a final partial judgment under Minnesota Rule
of Civil Procedure 52.02, “[b]ecause the amount of attorney fees
137
awarded in a mechanic’s lien action is not a separate claim.” In
other words, the court held that Rule 54.02 did not apply because
138
the proceedings did not involve multiple claims.

132. MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01, subdiv. 1 (emphasis added).
133. Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 104.01 states that “an appeal
may be taken from a judgment within 60 days after its entry, and from an
appealable order within 60 days after service by any party of written notice of its
filing.” MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01, subdiv. 1. According to the court of appeals,
Premier Bank must have appealed by April 9, 2008, in order for the appeal to have
been timely. T.A. Schifsky, 773 N.W.2d at 786.
134. MINN. R. CIV. P. 54.02; T.A. Schifsky, 773 N.W.2d at 786. Specifically,
Premier Bank argued that the November 26, 2007, order was not properly
certified as a final partial judgment under Rule 54.02 because the lien judgment,
by itself, did not fully adjudicate an entire claim. T.A. Schifsky, 773 N.W.2d at 786.
135. T.A. Schifsky, 773 N.W.2d at 787.
136. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 54.02.
137. T.A. Schifsky, 773 N.W.2d at 788. According to the court, an amount of
attorney’s fees is not another “legal theory of the lawsuit” that would meet Rule
54.02’s requirement of multiple claims. Id.
138. Id.
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Next, in order to determine if the court of appeals properly
dismissed the appeal regarding the validity of the liens, the court
addressed the question of whether the December 13, 2007 lien
139
judgment was immediately appealable as a final judgment.
The
140
court cited two rules it deemed relevant to the question at hand.
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 58.01 states that “[e]ntry of
judgment shall not be delayed for the taxation of costs, and the
141
omission of costs shall not affect the finality of the judgment.” In
addition, Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 104.02 states
that the “[t]ime to appeal from the judgment pursuant to this
section shall not be extended by the subsequent insertion therein
142
of costs and disbursements.” Relying on its decision in Obraske v.
143
Woody, the court concluded that attorney’s fees in mechanic’s lien
cases are considered costs within the meaning of Rules 58.01 and
144
104.02. As costs, attorney’s fees are collateral to the merits of the
145
underlying litigation regarding the validity of the liens.
Therefore, the attorney’s fee determination was not an issue that
would prevent the December 13, 2007 judgment from becoming
146
final.
Applying these findings to the facts of the case, the court
concluded that the appeal period began to run upon entry of the
December 17 judgment such that Premier Bank’s appeal regarding
147
the validity of the liens was untimely.
In the opinion, Justice Meyer added that characterizing the
attorney’s fee determination as collateral to the merits did not
contradict the court’s prior holding in American Family Mutual
148
Insurance Co. v. Peterson.
Justifying her assertion, she explained
that the attorney’s fee issue in Peterson prevented the running of the
appeal period because the fees were “part of the damages owed by
149
the breaching insurer.”
However, she added, the case at hand
139. Id. at 788.
140. Id. at 788–89 (citing MINN. R. CIV. P. 58.01; MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.02).
141. MINN. R. CIV. P. 58.01.
142. MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.02.
143. 199 N.W.2d 429, 432 (Minn. 1972).
144. T.A. Schifsky, 773 N.W.2d at 789.
145. Id. Justifying its holding that the attorney’s fees are collateral to the
merits of the case, the court cited its previous decisions from 1985–2000 in which
it characterized attorney’s fees issues as collateral. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 393 N.W.2d 212, 217
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986), rev’d, 380 N.W.2d 495, 495 (Minn. 1986)).
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was distinguishable because the attorney’s fees pursuant to statute
and case law in mechanic’s lien cases are considered costs as
150
opposed to damages attached to the merits of the case. Through
this analysis, the court illuminated an important dichotomy that
drives determination of the effect of attorney’s fees on the finality
of judgments: fees constituting damages owed are generally
connected to the merits of the litigation and must be decided in
order for a judgment to be final; however, fees that are merely costs
are generally collateral to the merits and do not affect the finality
151
of the original judgment.
On two occasions in T.A. Schifsky, the Minnesota Supreme
Court expressly urged Minnesota courts to approach attorney’s fee
152
appeals in a manner that prevents piecemeal appeals.
After
interpreting the application of Rule 54.02, the court provided the
following guidance:
We have recognized that this reading of the rules may, in
some circumstances, result in piecemeal appeals, but we
have also noted that piecemeal appeals are easily avoided
if the district court declines to direct the entry of
judgment on the merits until it has resolved the attorney
153
fees award . . . .
Applying its advice to T.A. Schifsky, the court recognized the
154
strategy “was not done in this case.”
V. ANALYSIS
A. Ensuring Efficiency: Does Minnesota’s Approach to Attorney’s Fees
Produce Unnecessary Inefficiencies by Encouraging Piecemeal Appeals?
1.

The Problem of a Second Major Litigation

In T.A. Schifsky, the Minnesota Supreme Court explained that
when attorney’s fees are costs as opposed to damages, the fees are
to be considered collateral and independent of the merits of the
155
underlying litigation.
When attorney’s fees are collateral,
potential errors surrounding their administration can be appealed
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 788 n.4, 789.
Id. at 788, n.4.
Id.
See id. at 789.
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separately from the merits. Hence, the collateral characterization
of attorney’s fees inevitably gives rise to an important concern
regarding judicial efficiency: attorney’s fees issues that are
collateral to the merits have the potential of burdening the courts
through the creation of piecemeal appeals.
Federal courts have often characterized attorney’s fees as
156
collateral to the merits of the litigation.
As a consequence, the
separation of appeals regarding attorney’s fees and appeals on the
157
merits is relatively common.
In Hensley v. Eckerhart, the U.S.
Supreme Court noted its concern regarding piecemeal appeals in
federal courts when it stated that “a request for attorney’s fees
158
should not result in a second major litigation.”
Other federal
159
Moreover,
courts have echoed the Supreme Court’s sentiment.
scholarly debate has also drawn connections between the federal
approach to attorney’s fees and potential inefficiencies due to
156. See, e.g., Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988)
(discussing the “recoverability or amount of attorney’s fees for the litigation” and
concluding that they do not bear on the finality of the underlying case); White v.
New Hampshire Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1982) (explaining that
a “court’s decision of entitlement to fees [under § 1988] will . . . require an
inquiry separate from the decision on the merits.”); Echols v. Parker, 909 F.2d
795, 798 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[A]ttorney’s fees are considered collateral to the merits,
so that final judgments as to attorney’s fees can be appealed separately from the
‘merits’ judgment.”); Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., 849 F.2d 955, 957 (5th Cir.
1988) (“[A]wards of attorney’s fees may be appealed separately as final orders
after a final determination of liability on the merits.”).
157. See, e.g., Torres v. Walker, 356 F.3d 238, 241 n.3 (2d Cir. 2004)
(explaining that the court had jurisdiction over an inmate’s immediate appeal of
district judge’s order of attorney’s fees in excessive force § 1983 suit); People Who
Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 272 F.3d 936, 937 (7th Cir.
2001) (holding that attorney’s fees appeal was properly before the court based on
the collateral order exception, because the refusal of an immediate appeal might
inflict an irreparable harm on the defendant); Riverhead Sav. Bank v. Nat’l Mortg.
Equity Corp., 893 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1990) (justifying its jurisdiction to hear
attorney’s fees sanction appeal by explaining that a “sanctions order imposed
solely on a non-party to pay attorney’s fees and costs falls within the collateral order
exception to the finality rule and is appealable immediately as a final order.”)
(emphasis in original); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1172 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (justifying its jurisdiction to hear an appeal on attorney’s fees because the
“district court’s denial of costs and attorneys’ fees fits within the collateral order
exception to the finality rule.”); Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d 160, 164 n.7 (2d Cir.
1980) (justifying jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order regarding attorney’s
fees based on the collateral order doctrine).
158. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
159. Friends of Boundary Water Wilderness v. Thomas, 53 F.3d 881, 883 (8th
Cir. 1995) (quoting Jenkins v. Missouri, 838 F.2d 260, 264 (8th Cir. 1988)) (“The
case now before us flies in the face of the Supreme Court’s admonishment that the
‘attorneys’ fee issue should not result in a second major litigation.’”).
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160

increased appellate litigation.
Because Minnesota courts have often characterized attorney’s
161
fees as collateral to the merits of the litigation, one would expect
to find that attorney’s fees appeals and appeals on the merits are
often separated into different proceedings. However, the same
concerns regarding efficiency and piecemeal appeals at the federal
level have not come to fruition in Minnesota. As a general
proposition, attorney’s fees issues in Minnesota have not extensively
burdened courts with separate appeals, because Minnesota courts
162
have long recognized the advice embodied by T.A. Schifsky and
“rule[d] on [attorney’s fee] claims as soon as possible after the
163
entry of judgment on the merits.”
2. An Important Factor in Preventing Piecemeal Attorney’s Fees
Appeals: Embracing the Advice of the Minnesota Supreme Court in
T.A. Schifsky by Consolidating Appeals
In T.A. Shifsky, the Minnesota Supreme Court implicitly
recognized that additional attorney’s fees appeals could
164
significantly burden the courts. In an attempt to prevent such a
problem, the court restated the advice it originally provided in
1984, which was that district court judges should either “rule on
such claims as soon as possible after the entry of judgment on the
merits or . . . not enter judgment on the merits until the fees issue
165
has been resolved.” However, the court did not indicate whether
the revitalization of the advice was a response to the unfortunate
circumstances in T.A. Schifsky or a reflection of the district courts’
general unwillingness to apply the advice.
When reviewing Minnesota appellate opinions related to
attorney’s fees, one is hard-pressed to find cases in which attorney’s
fees were appealed separately from the underlying merits. While a

160. See Crummins, supra note 12, at 488 (“The federal courts of appeals
disagree whether a decision on the merits of a case represents a ‘final’ judgment,
and thus is appealable, when the district court has awarded, but not quantified,
attorney’s fees.”); see also Green, supra note 12, at 232 (discussing how
considerations of court efficiency are tied to the “chameleon-like quality” of
attorney’s fees at the federal level).
161. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Spaeth v. City of Plymouth, 344 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Minn. 1984).
163. T.A. Schifsky & Sons, Inc. v. Bahr Const., LLC, 773 N.W.2d 783, 788 n.4
(Minn. 2009) (quoting Spaeth, 344 N.W.2d at 825).
164. See id.
165. Id.
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number of factors may influence this trend, an important factor is
166
Despite the
the consolidation of appeals at the appellate level.
fact that attorney’s fees can be appealed separately from the merits
when they are characterized as collateral, Minnesota Court of
Appeals judges generally consolidate attorney’s fees appeals with
167
other merit-based appeals.
In fact, a detailed review of fees
appeals in Minnesota indicates that the practice of consolidation
168
has been commonplace over the past two decades. The frequent
practice of consolidating appeals indicates that judges are heeding
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s advice and ruling on attorney’s fee
169
issues “as soon as possible after entry of judgment on the merits.”
An example of this consolidation practice may illuminate its
practical value in combating piecemeal fee appeals. In State
Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board v. Minnesota DemocraticFarm Labor Party, the district court granted the Democratic-Farm
Labor (DFL) Party’s motion for summary judgment after the
Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board (Board) initiated a
170
declaratory judgment action. The DFL moved for attorney’s fees
and costs under the Minnesota Equal Access to Justice Act and was
171
awarded $24,456 in fees. While the motion for attorney’s fees was
pending, the Board appealed both the summary judgment decision
172
and the attorney’s fee amount.
On appeal, the summary
judgment and attorney’s fees issues were consolidated in order to
prevent multiple appeals stemming from the same initial
173
litigation.

166. See MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 103.02, subdiv. 3 (“Related appeals from a single
trial court action or appeals in separate actions may be consolidated by order of
the appellate court on its own motion or upon motion of a party.”).
167. In some situations, consolidating appeals may be impractical due to
timing. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., In re Custody of N.A.K., 649 N.W.2d 166, 173 (Minn. 2002);
Haarstad v. Graff, 517 N.W.2d 582, 584 (Minn. 1994); Welsh v. City of Orono, 355
N.W.2d 117, 119 n.3 (Minn. 1984); Brown v. Cannon Falls Twp., 723 N.W.2d 31,
39 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); Cent. Baptist Theological Seminary v. City of New
Brighton, 487 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Bergmann v. Lee Data
Corp., 467 N.W.2d 636, 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); In re Minn. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n, 365 N.W.2d 341, 343 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
169. T. A. Schifsky, 773 N.W.2d at 788 n.4.
170. State Campaign Fin. & Pub. Disclosure Bd. v. Minn. Democratic-Farm
Labor Party, 671 N.W.2d 894, 896–97 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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Minnesota courts’ practice of consolidation illuminates an
important tactic in combating potential piecemeal appeals when
attorney’s fees issues are at stake. As previously noted, when courts
characterize the attorney’s fee issues as collateral, they theoretically
open the door to separately appealing the merits and fees.
However, consolidation ensures that both appeals are heard in the
same proceeding and therefore minimizes potential piecemeal
appeals that may result from the collateral characterization of
attorney’s fees.
B. Fairness: Does T.A. Schifsky Provide the Clarity That is Necessary to
Prevent Untimely Appeals Due to the Characterization of Attorney’s Fees?
1.

Introduction

In order for a litigant to be afforded the opportunity to appeal
a judgment, the litigant must have some knowledge as to whether
174
or not the judgment is considered final and appealable.
Unfortunately, jurisdictions tend to differ as to what constitutes a
175
final judgment. One can no longer assume that the last order in
176
The finality of a
the case is the only final appealable order.
judgment is particularly important in determining the limited
177
window of time in which a particular appeal can be filed.
While this note has shown that attorney’s fees are often
considered collateral to the merits in Minnesota, the Minnesota
178
Supreme Court’s decision in Peterson and dicta in T.A. Schifsky
179
indicate that fees can also be attached to the merits. This raises
an important issue. Knowledge as to whether the attorney’s fees
issues are characterized as collateral to the merits or attached to
the merits is a critical factor in appealing within a timely manner.
Therefore, how does a litigant in Minnesota know how the attorney
fee’s issue will be characterized in his or her case?
174. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 79 (2007) (indicating that appeals are
generally permitted only from final decisions or judgments).
175. MARY KAY KANE, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL § 7.1 (6th ed. 2007)
(“The question of what constitutes finality is one that has posed significant
difficulties for the courts.”).
176. Annotation, supra note 69, at 271.
177. MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01 (an appeal must be made within sixty days
after the final judgment is entered).
178. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 380 N.W.2d 495, 496 (Minn. 1986).
179. T.A. Schifsky & Sons, Inc. v. Bahr Const., LLC, 773 N.W.2d 788, 789
(Minn. 2009).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss1/2

26

Holth: Civil Procedure: I Win, You Pay: Considerations of Efficiency and

2010]

T.A. SCHIFSKY

293

2. T.A. Schifsky: Adopting the Case-By-Case Approach to the
Characterization of Attorney’s Fees
In T.A. Schifsky, the Minnesota Supreme Court attempts to
provide litigants with the guidance necessary to predict how
attorney’s fees will be characterized. The court’s discussion of fees
serves as an implicit recognition that litigants have lacked the
necessary guidance to determine whether a judgment is final when
a question of attorney’s fees remained. While the court emphasizes
the important difference between fees as costs and fees as damages,
it concedes that “our decision in [American Family Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Peterson] did not specifically describe the nature of attorney
180
fees at issue.”
In an effort to resolve ambiguity, the court
implicitly reasons that the categorization of attorney fees as
damages or costs will resolve the question of whether or not the fee
determination prevents a judgment from becoming final and
181
appealable.
In this sense, the court in T.A. Schifsky adopts what Richard S.
Crummins has dubbed the case-by-case approach to the
182
characterization of attorney’s fees.
According to Crummins, a
court applying the case-by-case analysis ultimately looks to the
purpose for which the attorney’s fees are being awarded as a means
183
of determining their relationship to the merits. When fees are a
measure of substantive relief and are part of the initial measure of
liability, they are compensatory in nature and are therefore
184
intertwined with the underlying merits of the case. On the other
hand, when fees are merely to reduce litigation costs, they are
185
generally collateral to the underlying judgment.
Unfortunately, the court in T.A. Schifsky oversimplifies the ease
with which litigants can confidently categorize the nature of the
attorney fees. The arguments made by the parties in T.A. Schifsky
186
highlight the complexity of such a categorization.
The
180. Id. Justice Meyer goes on to explain that even though the attorney’s fees
in American Family Mutual. Insurance. Co. v. Peterson were not explicitly categorized
as costs or damages, it should have been clear that they were damages because
they were available based on a breach of a contractual duty to defend. Id.
181. Id.
182. Crummins, supra note 12, at 488–89.
183. Id. at 507.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Compare Brief of Appellant at 15–17, T.A. Schifsky & Sons, Inc. v. Bahr
Const., LLC, 773 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Minn. 2009) (No. A08-1295), 2008 WL

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010

27

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 2

294

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1

respondent, Consolidated Lumber, argued that Minnesota case law
has established that attorney’s fees in mechanic’s lien cases are
187
considered “costs.”
However, the appellant, Premier Bank,
reasoned that attorney’s fees awarded under the mechanic’s lien
statute are an element of the claimant’s damages because,
according to the statute, the attorney’s fees become part of the lien
188
amount when the property is sold to satisfy the lien judgment.
Considering the merger of the attorney’s fees into the lien
judgment, it would not be unreasonable to consider them part of
the damages that are linked to the underlying merits of the case.
Perhaps the Minnesota Supreme Court should not be faulted
for failing to develop clear criteria for an issue that is inherently
189
complex.
While particular judgments and orders are more
clearly attached to the underlying merits of the case, commentators
have noted that it is particularly difficult to determine whether
190
attorney’s fee orders are tied to the merits. This is likely because,
unlike many orders and judgments, those relating to attorney’s fees
191
are often “only tangentially related to the merits” of the case.
3. The Need for Clarity in the Characterization of Attorney’s Fees:
Potential Solutions
After the ruling in T.A. Schifsky, it seems likely that, in some
cases, doubt may remain as to whether or not a subsequent
determination of attorney’s fees prevents the appeal period from
beginning to run. Untimely appeals could be prevented by
encouraging litigants to appeal an initial judgment on the merits
even if it seems that the attorney’s fee issue is tied to damages.
7212058 (arguing that attorney’s fees must be considered damages under the
mechanic’s lien statute because the statute mandates that fees awarded must be
included in the lien amount and judgment), with Brief of Respondent at 12–13,
T.A. Schifsky & Sons, Inc. v. Bahr Const., LLC, 773 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Minn. 2009)
(No. A08-1295), 2009 WL 4548824 (arguing that the mechanic’s lien statute and
prior case law has categorized attorney’s fees as collateral costs such that they do
not affect the finality of the original judgment).
187. Brief of Respondent, supra note 186, at 12; see also Obraske v. Woody, 199
N.W.2d 429, 432 (Minn. 1972).
188. Brief of Appellant, supra note 186, at 16; see also MINN. STAT. § 514.14
(2008) (“Judgment shall be given in favor of each lienholder for the amount
demanded and proved, with costs and disbursements to be fixed by the court at
the trial, and such amount shall not be included in the lien of any other party . . .
.”).
189. See Annotation, supra note 69, at 271.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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However, this runs counter to the policy underlying the final
judgment rule of preventing “fragmentary and premature appeals
that unnecessarily delay the administration of justice” and
192
encouraging one appeal per case.
A solution to the confusion in T.A. Schifsky may be the
development of a bright-line rule in which attorney’s fees are
characterized as collateral to the merits in all cases. It is unlikely
that the legal community would be greatly affected by such a rule
because, as demonstrated by the previous discussion regarding
efficiency, Minnesota courts primarily characterize attorney’s fees
as collateral. A unified collateral characterization would also
prevent litigants from being forced to wait until attorney’s fee
determinations are complete to collect a judgment or begin
appealing substantive issues. Moreover, as discussed in the
previous section, a collateral characterization generally does not
produce piecemeal appeals because Minnesota district court judges
are resolving fee issues in time to consolidate the appeals. Finally, a
bright-line collateral rule would eliminate any confusion litigants
face when trying to predict how attorney’s fees issues will be
characterized in order to appeal in a timely manner. Had a brightline rule been in place prior to T.A. Schifsky, Premier Bank may
have appealed the original judgment in a timely manner without
waiting for the pending attorney’s fee determination.
An alternative solution may be the development of a
procedural rule that forces district court judges to issue a sua sponte
order characterizing attorney’s fees issues as either collateral or
attached to the merits. Particularly where attorney’s fees are
available through a statute, district judges would have the ability to
analyze the statutory language and determine whether or not the
fees in question, if implicated, would be attached to the underlying
193
merits of the case. In addition, such a rule must also provide the
litigants with an opportunity to brief arguments relating to the
192. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 81 (2007).
193. Attorney’s fees may be available to a litigant because they are prescribed
in a statute that is implicated in the case. T.A. Schifsky & Sons, Inc. v. Bahr Const.,
LLC, 773 N.W.2d 783, 789 (Minn. 2009). Attorney’s fees may also be available
where the wrongful acts of the defendant have involved the plaintiff in litigation
or have placed the plaintiff in a situation in which he or she is forced to incur
expense for the protection of his or her rights or interests. ROSSI, supra note 8, at
§ 8:3. However, because a determination of attorney’s fees based on a wrongful
act will depend on facts that may arise during the trial, it would be more difficult
for a judge to make a decision regarding the fees’ relationship to the merits prior
to trial in that particular circumstance.
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characterization of the attorney’s fees prior to the judge’s decision.
The briefs could be submitted at a time that would permit the
194
judge to render a decision at a Rule 16 pre-trial conference.
The utility of a sua sponte ruling is significantly diminished if
the district court’s determination may be overturned on appeal.
Therefore, in order for the rule to maintain its purpose of
providing clarity to litigants, determinations made under it must be
final and non-appealable. While the non-appealable nature of such
an order may significantly diverge from ordinary appellate practice,
it would nevertheless ensure that litigants would possess the
knowledge as to whether a subsequent attorney’s fee determination
will affect the finality of a judgment. This knowledge, in turn, will
allow the litigant to accurately gauge the appeal period for a
195
particular issue in order to avoid filing in an untimely manner.
VI. CONCLUSION
The analysis of Minnesota courts’ approach to attorney’s fees
has yielded mixed results. As seen in federal courts, the collateral
characterization of attorney’s fees opens the door to potential
piecemeal appeals.
However, Minnesota courts have long
combated this potential judicial inefficiency by following the advice
originally outlined in Spaeth and renewed in T.A. Schifsky that
attorney’s fees claims should be decided as soon as possible after
the entry of judgment. This expediency has, in turn, allowed
appellate courts to reduce piecemeal appeals through the
consolidation of attorney’s fees appeals and appeals on the merits.
However, the court’s adoption of a case-by-case approach to
the characterization of attorney’s fees in T.A. Schifsky is unlikely to
provide litigants with the clarity to determine whether attorney’s
fees are considered collateral to the merits or attached to the
194. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 16.01 (“In any action, the court may in its discretion
direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before
it for a conference or conferences before trial.”).
195. It is worth noting that such a preliminary determination regarding the
nature of the attorney’s fees in T.A. Schifsky may have prevented Premier Bank’s
untimely appeal. Had the trial court judge made an irreversible preliminary
ruling that the attorney’s fees were costs that were collateral to the merits of the
case, Premier Bank would have likely been alerted to the fact that the attorney’s
fee claim would not be considered a separate claim on its own merits under
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Therefore, in such a case, Premier Bank
may have appealed at an earlier time under the presumption that the initial
judgment was final and appealable.
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merits. As demonstrated in T.A. Schifksy, when the nature of the
attorney’s fees is unclear, litigants may be prone to filing an
untimely appeal. Minnesota courts would be wise to consider
solutions that would eliminate the case-by-case approach to
attorney’s fees in favor of a mechanism that favors clarity and
certainty in characterizing attorney’s fees. Regardless of the
approach, the advice given by Michael Green over twenty-five years
ago still rings true today: “providing clear and certain rules to
govern the multifaceted procedural problems raised by the
relationship among the merits, attorney’s fees, and appeals is of
196
paramount importance.”

196.

Green, supra note 12, at 301.
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